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The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics
Like microbes in a petri dish, the streets of the capital were clogged with an unusually
copious volume of traffic. It was rush hour and a convoy of olive drab Humvees had made
parking lots of the roadways on my route through Beirut. I would have to be swift in navigating
the maze of automobiles and concrete low-rises if I was to stay on time through the
entanglement. Striding up one final bullet-pocked block toward the Lebanese American
University, it was hard not to notice the exodus of college students retreating in the opposite
direction. Exclamations of dismay and exasperation were all but painted on their faces as they
pushed past. At the top of the hill I rounded the corner only to find the university encircled by
military personnel brandishing riot shields and belt-fed machine guns. Class was called off for
the day.
A fight had broken out between students of rival political coalitions, who ran as
candidates of actual national parties in the 2011 undergraduate elections. Each side had taken to
hurling stones, chairs and trashcans before the army was eventually deployed. “Supporters of
former Prime Minister Saad Harari’s Future Movement clashed with students loyal to Speaker
Nabih Berri,” reported an English language news agency (Kheir, 2011). As the dust settled
however, it became clear that the roots of the melee ran deeper than partisan enmity alone. In
Lebanon, the electorate is scrupulously separated along ethno-religious divides. What had
superficially masqueraded as a clash of ideology was principally a theological feud between the
Middle East’s Sunni and Shia Islamic factions.
The engagement serves as a window into the animosities that have come to pervade
nearly every aspect of daily life. Today, polarizing sectarian identities contribute to the ongoing
politicization of everything from holy matrimony to soccer matches. It is evident that Lebanon
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faces a festering national crisis, which threatens to reinvigorate communal tensions and further
destabilize society.
But what if it was possible to engineer society so as to accommodate these forces, thereby
averting future conflicts? Answering this question had weighed heavily on the imperial French
when the seaside territory was initially carved out of Greater Syria. The new nation would
feature a constitution that set it apart from any other country of the time. Under the innovative
power sharing structure, specific governmental offices were to be reserved for specific ethnoreligious communities. Each election cycle, the President would be a Maronite Catholic, the
Prime Minister would be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament would be a Shia
Muslim. In this way the three most prominent “confessional” groups were guaranteed
theoretically proportional representation under the law (Friedman, 1989). The state was to be
more than another postcolonial artifact; it was an ambitious experiment in peace building.
Lebanon’s one-of-a-kind system and sectarian diversity have combined to produce a
society unique in its strengths and weaknesses. However, the course of the last decade has
produced another Middle Eastern state, which in its composition bears a striking resemblance to
confessionalism.
Since the U.S. led coalition toppled Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime in 2003, Iraq has
shared increasingly convergent experiences with that of Lebanon’s idiosyncratic past.
Similarities are perhaps most notable between their governmental frameworks, each deliberately
designed to placate primordial grievances.
The confessional system embodies the de jure incarnation of the “consociational” model
advocated chiefly by political scientist Arend Lijphart as a means for guaranteeing different
demographic groups government representation in ethnically conflicted societies. According to
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his prescription consociationalism features four primary characteristics that define the model.
Firstly, offices are to be allocated to each sect based on the proportion of the overall population
that sect comprises (Dixion, 2011). In the Lebanese case, Maronites, whom at the time of
independence constituted the most numerous ethnic segment, were awarded the post of
Presidency. In accordance with an existing Catholic/Sunni Muslim pact, Sunnis were allocated
the Premiership and Shia Muslims were soon after reserved the office of the Speaker of the
House. Proportional allocation was further distributed throughout lower levels of government. It
was agreed that parliament would be divided by a six to five formula of Christians to Muslims.
Secondly, the consociational framework calls for a “Grand Coalition” to bring together
community leaders for inclusive engagement on shared policies. Thirdly, communal autonomy
grants each sect a degree of independence to address its own affairs as it sees fit (Dixion, 2011).
In Lebanon the 18 officially recognized religious groups have the authority to determine
Personal Status Laws regarding the identity of their members. Eventually, the Lebanese Shia and
Druze were even granted their own judiciary (Kriener, 2012). Lastly, a mutual veto is granted to
each sect so that “any decisions deemed detrimental by any community can be voted down”
(Imad Harab, 2006).
It should be recognized that the power-sharing framework inherited by postcolonial
Lebanon, while preventing the tyranny of many of its Arab neighbors, shaped a reality of mutual
fear among religious groups. Confessional government has steadily done its share in polarizing
loyalties in favor of the recognized religious communities and away from a coherent sense of
Lebanese nationalism. The political structure therefore strengthens its ethno-sectarian groups at
its own expense. Consequently, the confessional system in fact fuels the very effect it was
tailored to mitigate. After the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990 ethno-religious tensions became
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even more entrenched. Iraq, having recently experienced its own civil war under U.S.
occupation, and currently split in the same communal manner, is at risk of falling into the
confessional trap that has marred Lebanese society for decades.
Nearly ten years since the overhaul of Iraq’s governing institutions, Baghdad finds itself
at a critical period of transition. Potential still exists for a population of coexistence and
sustainable development but, as evinced by the Lebanese record, this outcome does not follow
from the tenets of confessionalism. If Iraq is to progress past its civil hostilities and endeavor for
modernization and stability, it must shed its political sectarian chains before they become further
embedded within society.
In order to foster a sound sense of national identity, confessional civilizations must
integrate state schools, deemphasize religious differences, and promote a shared history through
standardized curriculums. Due to the pivotal role education can play in the upbringing of a
responsible and cohesive citizenry; education policy will be the focus of this trans-national
analysis on public service provision.
This comparison is further facilitated by a striking abundance of qualitative as well as
quantitative similarities ranging from demographics to historical benchmarks.

Comparative Education Development and Sect Polarization
Schooling functions beyond the instruction of its established discipline areas and extends
to the socialization of the student into society. This effect presents itself in both Iraq as well as
Lebanon through the coevolution of educational reform initiatives and sectarian undercurrents.
No comparison of confessional education policy should be considered comprehensive without an
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overview of institutional developments and of the historical interplay of each country’s sectarian
groups.
Both Iraq and Lebanon feature three dominant ethno-religious communities whose
jockeying characterizes each country’s predominant political and social milieus. Therefore a
sum of six independent ethnic segments will be emphasized throughout the course of the study.
Of these demographics, Arab-Sunni and Shia Islamic denominations are notable players in both
of the featured states. Subsequently, consociational grievances can often seem to duplicate
themselves between Lebanon and Iraq as these sects coevolve in reaction to one another across
the wider Middle East. Yet, Sunni and Shia camps are not entirely monolithic communities when
analyzed in the regional context. Aspects of the national and local environments contribute to
characteristic differences that colorize and differentiate all six respective ethno-religious
segments. Understanding the progression of these groups is crucial to interpreting current
sectarian realities, which prevail throughout the societies of both countries.
This chronicle will focus mainly on the periods of confessionalism most relevant to this
study. For Lebanon, confessional history spans the decades after its liberation from the French
Mandate in 1943 till the present (Harb, 2006). Iraq in contrast has experienced a much shorter,
albeit eventful, confessional era since the establishment of the new constitution in 2005. Several
pre-confessional developments also warrant mention along within the following chronology.

Lebanon owes its existence in large part to foreign influence, which has characterized the
Levantine region since the Ottoman era. The French particularly became increasingly involved
until the ratification of the Lebanese constitution in 1926. Under the guidance of Paris, Lebanon
would become a Maronite state for Maronite Christians who resided in the northern mountains.
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Doubts concerning the viability of the state persuaded the French to expand Lebanese territory to
include the agricultural south and the commercial Beirut port (B. Sollukh, personal
communication, November 2011). 1By the time the dots were connected and the lines were
drawn, a significant and lucrative enclave had been carved out of Greater Syria. Seemingly
overnight the balance of factional power had been turned on its head. Muslims, who once lived
in a fairly homogenous Islamic State then became a minority whose power decreased under the
now majority of Catholics. In this way the establishment of Lebanon was also the creation of an
enduring identity crisis. It’s due in part to this crisis that the aforementioned Confessional
government was created.
Today’s consociational blueprint however is a response to age-old sectarian divisions,
many which emerged in antiquity and became more and more hostile in modern times. The
initial delineation of Lebanon’s borders tended to frame communal struggles in Christian VS.
Muslim terms. Although it could be said that competition among all Lebanese factions has
steadily intensified, the dominant contemporary tug-of-war is divided between inter-Muslim
groups.
The rift bisecting Islamic orthodoxy goes back to the sixth century A.D. following the
death of the prophet Mohammed. Soon after his passing a dispute arose concerning how to
determine Mohammed’s successor who would lead the Islamic community, or Umma, as head
caliph. Many religious elders expected to proceed in accordance with customary tribal practice,
nomination by consensus. These forerunners were the first members of the Sunni sect, whom

1

Dr. Bassel Salloukh is Associate Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and Associate Professor of
Political Science at the Lebanese American University in Beirut, Lebanon. He also serves as a senior
research fellow at the Interuniversity Consortium for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies in Montreal,
Canada.
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ultimately followed through with their tradition, agreeing to appoint Mohammed’s father-in-law,
Abu Bakr, as the Umma’s first caliph (Nasr, 2006).
At the same time, a minority of Muslim followers advocated that the prophet’s successor
be descended from his familial bloodline. Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin, was
designated as their prophet of choice who, it was felt, had been usurped by the Sunni
community’s anointment. This disagreement was further invigorated when Ali’s revered second
son, Imam Hussein, went to battle against the forces of the Sunni hierarchy in modern day Iraq.
Impossibly outnumbered, Hussein and a meager contingent of followers was no match for the
Caliphate. His death and the historic sidelining of the community by dominant Sunni oligarchies
have since built notions of marginalization into the Shia identity. The contemporary mainstream
ideologue tends to venerate the concept of martyrdom and an unending struggle between good
and evil (Nasr, 2006).
By the 11th century an alternative doctrine had developed out of Shia theology and a
portion of the community subdivided. This minority, the Druze, follow a highly secretive
religion that prefers to isolate itself between the mountains of Lebanon and Syria (Blanford,
2011). Although they are not among Lebanon’s three primary sects focused on within this study,
they have at times managed to shake the country’s social and political arena.
In 1840 deteriorating relations with an intermixed Maronite population drove the Druze
to open and armed conflict with their Christian compatriots. Warfare between the two factions
grew in frequency and eventually erupted into ethnic cleansings perpetrated by both sides in
1860 (Salibi, 1988)). In the decades since then the Druze have gone on to wage a brutal
campaign during the second Lebanese Civil War, and to exercise a particular political leverage
which has empowered the community while garnering intrusion by international actors.
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The calamitous events of 1860 drew the attention of the French who felt it was proper to
protect their Catholic fellows from Druze aggressions. Soon thereafter the French landed troops
in the then Ottoman Empire and sent them to be stationed in the Mount Lebanon territory where
the Christian population was concentrated (Salibi, 1988).
Iraq shares history as a member of the former Ottoman Empire that secured territory there
through centuries of contestation. The modern capital, Baghdad, had once been the capital of the
powerful Abassid Caliphate and had developed into a wealthy metropolis. By the time the
Ottomans came to control the area the Abassid Empire had long since fallen and Baghdad’s
prosperity had dwindled. However, the country could serve as a buffer from potential outside
attackers attempting to assault the Ottoman heartland. Additionally Iraq possesses the four most
important Shia shrines located in Najaf, Samarra, Kadhimayn, and Karbala where Imam Hussein
was martyred. Despite economic decline these shrines gave Iraq an invaluable religious
significance.
In order to control the territory Sultan-Caliphs of the Ottoman Empire were tasked with
defeating Persian forces that controlled the area (Tikriti, 2007). The imperial clash again pitted
Muslim Sunnis and Muslim Shia against each other, a theme that has resurged in contemporary
times.
In 1546 the Ottomans captured Baghdad and Basra and defended the locations from
numerous Persian attempts to reclaim the holy land. Around this time another Sunni group was
also consolidating its regional authority. The Kurds, an ethnic minority with their own language
and cultural practices, had recently been granted their own semi-autonomous enclave in Kirkuk
and Sulaymaniyah as a result of the Two Iraq’s Campaign (Yildiz, 2012). This acquisition was
one of the last great advancements of the Kurdish ‘Golden Age’ that lasted from the twelfth to
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the sixteenth centuries (Bengio, 2012). Since this period of development regional governments
have subverted the Kurds, fearful of the consequences independence could have for the strength
of their body politic. Today the Kurds are recognized as the largest nation without a state, only
making significant gains toward true sovereignty in modern times.
By the 18th Century border disputes with the Shia east had calmed down and the
contemporary Iraqi boundaries had begun to take shape. As Druze and Maronites clashed in
Lebanon and Syria the Ottomans faced a new threat emerging from the deserts to the south, this
time from within their very own religious camp. According to the Arabian Sunni Muhammed ibn
Abd al-Wahab the suffering of the Islamic world resulted due to straying from the initial
traditions of the time of the prophet. Offshoots such as Sufism and Shiism were viewed as
deviant and subversive diversions. His ultra orthodox teachings advocated a strict adherence to a
puritanical interpretation of the Quran for spiritual vitality. Abd al-Wahab preached that the
collective spiritual cleansing of the Sunni community and the emulation of Prophet
Muhammad’s Medina city-state could redeliver the Umma to prosperity. However conservative
the simplistic epistemology proved to be an appealing prescription for societal recovery (Meijer,
2009).
The doctrine of Wahhabism as it came to be known inspired followers throughout central
Arabia that rejected the authority of the Ottoman Empire and the outside religious minorities
they tolerated. After allying with the powerful al-Sa’ud family the movement advanced to
southern Iraq and began attacking Shiite shrines, including storming Karbala. Shia Clerics then
attempted to bolster their political stature and counter the Wahhabi tide by proselytizing Iraqi
tribes. The campaign led to a gradual but major expansion of the Shia community whose
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increased numbers, along with numerous additional factors, have helped secure them legislative
dominance following the latest American invasion (Tikriti, 2007).
More than any other indigenous sects the interplay of the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds have
characterized the Iraqi state just as the Shia, Sunnis and Maronites have been the predominant
constructive forces within Lebanon.
The end of WWI resulted in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The League
of Nations mandate for the Lebanese territory went to France, which later created the Greater
State of Lebanon in 1926 (Salibi, 1988). The state’s Confessional constitution was based on the
success of similar tactics used in managing multi-ethnic conflicts in the Netherlands (Dixion,
2011). Along with the four concociational principles the constitution also laid the groundwork
for the Lebanon’s education system. Article 10 of the original document granted each ethnoreligious group the right to administer their own private schools. However, in an effort to
distinguish the country from the cultural imprints of the French Mandate, Lebanon’s first office
holders revised the law so that all private schooling would be subject to management by the
Ministry of Education. Domestic debates about national identity, combined with foreign policy
complications resulted in a brief civil war in 1959. Shortly thereafter, it was decided that private
schools should instead be supervised by Lebanon’s six governorates (Abouchedid, Nasser &
Jeremy, 2002).
Many private educational institutions had been established during the French Mandate
through foreign avenues. As a result of Protestant and French missionary activity Christian
schools had sprung up in the Mt. Lebanon area. This prompted the Sunnis and Druze to open
their own academic institutions. At the time of independence these learning facilities provided an
alluring alternative to those of the weak and inexperienced state. The head start of private sector
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schooling, the autonomy afforded to them by law and the relative sovereignty of Lebanese
sectarian communities fostered the dominance of these nongovernment academic entities.
Theoretically, public and private schools are required to work in coordination with one another,
however each sphere now functions independently of the other (Nahas, 2011).
Lebanon’s geographic advantage as a regional trading intersection, in combination with
its strong banking sector, contributed to an economic golden age in the sixties and mid seventies.
Tourists came to equate the capital, Beirut, to the Paris or Switzerland of the Middle East.
However, the prosperity proved to be a deceptive façade as sectarian tensions deepened and
perpetuated governmental deadlock. Beyond the establishment of the Center for Educational
Research and Development (CERD), in 1971, very few educational accomplishments managed
to bear fruit (Nahas,2011). An ensuing second civil war stagnated educational development for
its 15-year duration and accelerated an emerging brain drain problem. (Abouchedid, Nasser &
Jeremy, 2002).
~ ~
Similarly, the contemporary Iraqi political sphere is influenced by an additional
dimension of sectarian atmospherics with which its intertwined. Sectarian divisions have been
politicized within Iraq for as long as the state can be considered “Iraqi.” Independence was
granted in 1932 after the British Mandate installed a Hashemite Sunni monarchy to rule over a
Shia religious majority. Sectarian polarization increased following the 1968 military coup that
brought the Ba’th Party to power. Also seen in Syria, this party outwardly promoted an ideology
of secularism, socialism and Pan-Arab Nationalism. The transition to Ba’athism corresponded
with score settling, reprisals and further centralization. Subsequently, this resulted in the first
exodus of Iraqi citizens (Geopoliticy, 2009).

The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics

15

Soon after the establishment of the University of Baghdad, came the discovery of
massive oil resources, which created a need for engineering skills. Iraq found itself awash with a
sudden influx of foreign petrol dollars. The inflated budget allowed President al-Bakr’s regime to
embark on an ambitious campaign against illiteracy with which he could attract back Iraqi
national expatriates. Over the next 20 years, Iraq fortified its educational policy until it was
recognized as one of the most advanced academic systems in the Middle East. All schooling,
from the primary through university levels became free and open to all Arabs, including
foreigners (Issa, J., & Jamil, H, 2010).
The 1979 revolution in neighboring Iran would have major repercussions for both
Lebanon and Iraq. For the first time Shia fundamentalism, historically sidelined by Sunnism,
succeeded in installing itself within the regional international arena. Buoyed by the
crystallization of Shia Political Islam the new government moved to export its religious ideology
throughout the Middle East (Hazran, 2010).
That same year al-Bakr abruptly resigned from the presidency and was replaced by
Saddam Hussein. The changeover was marked by the execution of 22 senior party officials
(Gause, 2010). As a majority Shia country neighboring Iran, Iraq’s openly defensive Sunni
administration began attempts to forestall the rise of a religiously galvanized opposition
movement (Hazran, 2010). However, policies targeting the Shia caste and clerical hierarchy
proved only to accelerate the religious polarization they were intended to undermine.
At the same time, Saddam also intensified his undertakings against Kurdish separatists in
the north. During the beginning phase of the Sunni-Baathist/Kurdish conflict, Baghdad went
about a massive resettlement project. Thousands of villages of Kurds were forcefully relocated to
government-monitored areas. Any of those who did not cooperate were listed as traitors and
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marked for execution (Power, 2002). Saddam’s two-fronted sectarian assault set the state on a
trajectory of ethno-religious tensions that would have catastrophic consequences later on.
In late September of 1980, Saddam Hussein launched attacks against the Iranian
revolutionary state, initiating the grueling Iran/Iraq war that proceeded for the better part of the
decade. Despite an exhaustive stalemate persisting on the battlefront the war seemed to have
little effect on Iraqi state education. Even as Iran supported revolutionary Shia and Kurdish
proxies within Iraq, the Ba’athists managed to continue their educational advancements (Guase,
2010).
In 1984 the Gross Enrollment Rate (GER), was listed above 100% with high gender
parity. In 1985, Iraq qualified for classification as an illiteracy free society according to
UNESCO standards, accomplishing its goal of total reading proficiency. It should be noted that
this pan-Iraqi achievement was accomplished in spite of Saddam’s increasing political and social
marginalization of Shia communities. During the last half of the 1980’s the toll of the Iran/Iraq
War, in conjunction with spiraling Kurdish tensions, spurred a period of brain drain and internal
crisis (Issa, & Jamil, 2010).
1988 saw the apex of both of the Baath’s major conflicts. By this time the two most
prominent Kurdish parties had thrown their weight behind an Iranian victory and even actively
fought against the Baghdad centered regime alongside Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The
United States had withdrawn its support for Kurdish fighters in the interest of fortifying Saddam
Hussein against the prospects of Iranian regional hegemony. In the absence of American
supervision the Baath regime was free to combat Kurdish separatists as it saw necessary. That
year, chemical gas attacks and mass executions befell the Kurdish north leaving upwards of
200,000 dead (Power, 2002).
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With the Kurdish insurgency suppressed Baghdad felt the time was right to negotiate the
end of a futile war that had resulted in utter deadlock. Although internal and external
engagements now appeared to be on hold, the eighties produced an Iraq demarcated with
sectarian grievances that had long been at work eroding the social fabric in Lebanon.
Nearly 15 years of fighting had fatigued Lebanese militias and resulted in all but state
collapse. The course of the war had brought about the invasion of the Palestinians, Syrians,
Israelis, Americans, Iranians, French and others. Lebanon’s municipalities crippled and
contributed to an environment of lawlessness, which invited foreign guerilla forces. According to
former CIA Case Officer Bob Baer, at one point even the Japanese Red Army had taken
advantage of the pandemonium and set up shop (2002). Another notable militant group was born
in a struggle to oust Israeli forces.
The emergence of the militia would not have been likely if it had not been for the
influence of the Shia Imam Sayyed Musa al-Sadr, who mobilized his coreligionists in Lebanon’s
Beqaa Valley. Due to the demographic composition of the valley, infrastructure and other public
services had been neglected for city centered development projects. In 1968 Musa al-Sadr
founded the Movement of the Deprived to empower the Shia poor and embolden them to
confront the government. When Lebanon fought itself in civil war less than a decade later the
movement formed an army named Amal with Musa al-Sadr as its leader (Blanford, 2012).
When Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran the conventionally subordinate Shiia
found themselves with a state to call their own. Eager to export their revolutionary ideology in
search of allies, Iran decided to back Shia Amal in Lebanon. However, Amal could not decide
whether it was or was not in favor of collaboration and the group divided. Thus Hezbollah,
which favored Iranian intervention, was born. It wasn’t long before the new player caught the
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eye of Syria, who saw Hezbollah as an enemy’s enemy. Although opposed to Iranian ideology,
Syria also began backing the Shia against the Lebanese Maronites. In the following years, a
young Hezbollah found itself waging pitched battles against Israel and the renegade South
Lebanese Army. (Sorenson, 2010).
Following more than a decade of war and ethnic cleansing, Lebanese sectarian prejudices
had reached heights that seemed irreparable. However, in 1989, Saudi Arabia led an international
summit that arbitrated the end of the second Civil War. Both Israel and Syria maintained a
military presence within the country, the former holding ground in the South and the latter in the
east and west. In order to ensure a peaceful border with their primary Middle Eastern ally, the
Americans permitted Syria uninterrupted control of Lebanese affairs (B. Sollukh, personal
communication, November 2011). With a green light from Washington the Syrian administration
was free to thoroughly exploit their western neighbors, establishing vast power centers within the
government (Sorenson, 2010). Syria’s unchecked foreign policy also allowed them to preserve
Hezbollah as an armed insurgency, which was intended for use as a bargaining chip to reclaim
the Golan Heights from Israeli occupation. Hezbollah had decided to recognize Syria’s dominion
over the Lebanese polity in the post-war period and in return the phrase “All necessary means to
liberate all Lebanese territory” was added to the Ta’if Accords, which concluded the Lebanese
Civil War (Blanford, 2011). Syria used this detail as authorization to allow Hezbollah to keep
their weapons while all other Lebanese groups were given six months to disarm (Young, 2010).
After decades of development Hezbollah has now emerged as a serious challenger to both
foreign and domestic authorities operating a virtual ministate in the east and south.
Only a year after the ratification of the Ta’if Accords and only three years after the end of
the Iran/Iraq War, Saddam annexed Kuwait. This rushed decision served as an ultimatum to the
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monarchies of the Gulf, who had been producing crude above the quotas of their collaborative
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As the availability of crude increased
the price per barrel began to dive. These market fluctuations betrayed the vulnerability of Iraq’s
oil-dependent rentier economy, and Saddam blamed Kuwait for attempting to engineer his
downfall. His subsequent military incursion into Kuwait prompted U.S. response, which initiated
the first Gulf War. As punishment for the invasion of an American ally, and for Saddam’s
pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) Washington began to impose a regime of
massive sanctions against the Iraqi state (Gause, 2010). The timing inconveniently coincided
with a new Baath policy of establishing a new university in each governorate that was hindered
by the ensuing fiscal crisis (Issa, J., & Jamil, H., 2010).
Throughout the 1990’s Iraq’s economic isolation contributed to a climate of hardship and
dissention. Funding for public services began to dry up. Gone were the golden days of
educational triumph. Iraq’s one-time academic model suffered stagnation and devolution, as did
many other categories of essential public services. Subsequently, the shortcomings of state
provisions drove citizens back to their primordial ties, which reinvigorated ethnic and religious
fractionalization (Hazran, 2010). To placate his nation Saddam tried to maintain his grip on
society by pursuing populist theatrics. Throughout the decade he became progressively more
outspoken about the strength of his faith and even introduced religion into the state curriculum
(UNESCO, 2011). Nevertheless, Iraqi national unity continued to degrade under the burden of
sanctions until the American invasion of 2003.
The U.S. led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), in charge of reconstructing Iraq,
wasted no time and embarked on a campaign of drastic restructuring. Alternative frameworks
proposed by the CPA reflected the authorities’ ignorance of Iraq’s sectarian rifts, which were
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unleashed with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist henchmen. George W. Bush,
Commander and Chief of U.S. Armed Forces, himself was oblivious to the nuances of Islam.
According to former Ambassador Peter Galbriath, when he informed Bush of the Shia/Sunni
divide just two months prior to invasion, the President responded simply, “I thought they were
Muslims” (Avard, 2006). Coalition forces, penned up within their Forward Operating Bases
(FOB’s), managed to remain perennially uninformed of the intensifying sectarian violence
escalating outside of their defensive perimeters. By the time it was realized that primordial
communal animosities had been reawakened armed clashes had become a regular occurrence
(Chandrasekaran, 2006). Caught off guard, the CPA attempted to maintain the coherence of the
Iraqi state and preserve its fantasy of establishing an exemplary democracy in the Middle East.
Under the leadership of Paul Bremmer, the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC) was
created according to the confessional formula that had marred Lebanon for decades. The
proportional quota system was imposed to fill council seats. Each community was afforded a
mutual veto on constitutional proposals. The high government posts of the IGC were reorganized
along sectarian lines so that the president was Kurdish, the prime minister was a Shia, and the
speaker of parliament was a Sunni (Katzman, 2013). Later in 2008, a new election law codified a
consociational distribution of parliament (Hazran, 2010). The application of this structure
actually functioned to sustain sectarian struggles while institutionalizing them into national
politics.
At the same time, Bremmer implemented an aggressive policy of “De-Baathification”
that unemployed vast swaths of Saddam’s former bureaucracy. Overnight, approximately 30,000
officials (mostly Sunnis), found themselves out of work as the Shia majority maneuvered to fill
the vacancies. By the time the new constitution was ratified in 2005, many of the victims of De-
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Baathification had organized into an insurgent movement that openly fought the American
occupiers to reclaim their historic post at the top of Iraqi society. This conflict destabilized a
tenuous atmosphere of repressed sectarian hostilities. The Sunni, Shia and Kurds at last came to
outright civil war in 2006 (Lamani, M., & Momani, B., 2010).

The Modern Educational Structure
Despite sharing some common challenges today, historical differences between the
Lebanese and Iraqi governmental frameworks contribute to their modern day differences.
The structure of the educational systems varies greatly when comparing each of these
countries. In theory, public and private Lebanese schools are to operate in coordination with one
another, although in practice these two sectors are quite independent (Nahas, 2011). The state of
Lebanon offers free education from the primary through secondary levels. All schools are
principally under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Higher Learning (MEHL). The
Center for Educational Research and Development (CERD) is supervised by the MEHL,
provides administrative support and plays a leading role in structuring the state curriculum.
Additionally an eight-member education committee evaluates institutions in conjunction with the
MEHL based on an outdated 1961 law (Abouchedid, Nasser & Jeremy, 2002).
In Lebanon elementary education is universal and mandatory for children ages six
through twelve. Education is divided into two main phases; Primary and Secondary. Primary
education is further segmented into two stages. The first stage includes kindergarten and grades
one, two and three. Until 2010 students were automatically promoted through these grades,
however, due to repetitively low performance in grade four, this policy was repealed. Primary
stage two involves grades four, five and six. Grades seven through nine then comprise an
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intermediate primary level that culminates in “Brevet” exam, required for advancement. The
Secondary phase extends until the age of 18 during which students work toward two
baccalaureate tests in the first and third year (Mattar, 2011).
Lebanon boasts one of the highest graduation rates in the Middle East region. However
only 37% of the total student body is enrolled in public schools (Nahas, 2011). For those that do
attend public schools the curriculum is largely secular with special priority given to the
construction of national identity. There are two primary categories of private schooling, those
being fee-paying, and government subsidized (Mattar, 2011). The bulk of private schools is
overwhelmingly administered by religious communities and operates highly independent of
government oversight. These institutions are not required to teach the standard national
curriculum and are not governed by the Ministry of Education but rather are under the
supervision of their Governorates (Shuyab, 2007).
The Lebanese state has also set additional policy to expand the student’s extra-curricular
involvement. The MEHL mandates all schools to establish student councils and encourage
pupils to participate. Unfortunately, these organizations are absent in many public schools.
Administrators are often apprehensive about actually instituting councils. In an interview one
principal told researchers that the councils would be used for “political debates and trivial
matters” (Shuyab, 2007)).
Iraq’s model is much more centralized in contrast. The Ministry of Education governs
preschool through secondary education while the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific
Research governs tertiary establishments. Within this framework each Governorate has a
Directorate of Education that handles administrative responsibilities associated with education,
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such as employment and training. Provincial education committees may make policy
recommendations to each Directorate but have no official binding powers (Geopolicity, 2009).
Opposite of the Lebanese system, Iraq spends a large amount of its budget on education
and covers the costs of schooling from the primary through university levels. However, after the
2003 invasion, U.S. led coalition forces have advocated the opening of Iraq to the international
market and private schools have played an increasingly prominent role (Saltman, 2007).
At present, schooling may begin as early as age four with enrollment in kindergarten.
Compulsory education starts with the Primary Education phase and includes grades one through
six. Secondary Education takes place in two three-year cycles and is provided as a right to all
citizens free of charge but is not mandatory. The first cycle is considered Intermediate Education,
and spans ages 12-14. The second cycle is Preparatory Education and takes place over a threeyear period from ages 15-17. During this final phase students may choose either arts or sciences
based tracts. Following the baccalaureate year some may enroll directly in a state sponsored
elementary teacher-training program or go on to university (Issa, J., & Jamil, H, 2010).

Trends in Education Reform
As previously demonstrated sectarian divisions now characterize both countries’ political
and social milieus. Mitigating internal communal conflict has emerged as the foremost priority in
each of the states. In addition to producing civil wars in Lebanon as well as Iraq, the evolution of
ethno-religious associations increasingly jeopardizes the legitimacy of the state as a sovereign
entity. In order for government institutions to survive they must foster a cohesive sense of
nationalism and unity for future generations. The study of Lebanon’s past brought acclaimed
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Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi to the conclusion that “for any people to develop and maintain a
sense of political community, it is necessary that they share a common vision of their past”
(1988). This reality places acute importance on the role of education in encouraging
understanding between sects. In fact, an analysis of each country’s pedagogic reform initiatives
reveals similar trends that reflect the prevailing ethno-religious polarization.

Second Chances
Firstly, both Iraq and Lebanon have come upon the opportunity to inaugurate new
government frameworks and policies that could alleviate sectarian infighting. In both instances
the decision making process was dominated by foreign powers and directly affected education
protocol. For Lebanon, this juncture offered itself in the form of the Ta’if Accord that ended the
second Civil War in 1989. Along with restructuring political institutions the treaty also set out to
rehabilitate the collapsed education system. 15 years of combat had wrought havoc on Lebanese
infrastructure, including schools. Lebanon’s only public university became disjointed, its campus
split in half along the “Green Line” of foliage that constituted a no-mans’-land separating
Christian and Muslim Beirut (Nahas, 2011). Reintegrating society would require new approaches
to identity building.
Two primary objectives were set in response to these daunting challenges. The Ta’if
aimed to re-socialize school children into a cohesive national identity. This was crucial to
addressing existing consociational grievances. Secondly, the accords would attempt to
standardize textbooks, which help to instill future generations with tolerance and protect the
sustainability of the state (Shuyab, 2007). Not only were textbooks 20 years outdated, the fact
that the majority of Lebanese students attended private, religious and semiautonomous schools
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meant the promotion of several inconsistent historical narratives. This issue had become an
enduring theme within Lebanese educational discourse. On the eve of the 1975 Civil War,
Lebanon’s communal leaders convened to acknowledge for the first time the need to compose a
standard text to be mandated in all learning institutions (Abouchedid, K., Nasser, R., & Jeremy,
V. B. 2002). However, ensuing factional violence made the reform of almost any type of public
good nearly impossible.
Unfortunately the Ta’if Accord undermined the potential of its two educational goals in
three ways. First, Article 95 redistributed the governments Grade-One Posts (the highest of five
promotional levels) according to sectarian status. Secondly, a Constitutional Council was in
order to introduce an additional layer of judiciary oversight, but it could only be appealed by
religious leaders. These two provisions reinforced the importance of sectarianism that had been
enshrined in the original constitution. Lastly, the Ta’if Accord upheld the power of private
schools to teach their own variations of history (Shuyab, 2007).
According to a study by Nisreen Salti and Jad Chaaban “the Ta’if Accords reinforced
sectarian rifts by focusing reform on power sharing and confessional redistribution rather than
the creation of a secular citizenry.” Researchers used voting records from 1993 until 2005 to
estimate the sectarian composition of each district. Then the percentages were compared with the
sects’ share of public funding for development related fields such as Health Care and Education
from 1996 to 2005. The results showed that the distribution of public expenditure closely
mirrored each sect’s proportion of the overall population. For example, the Druze, which account
for 6% of the politically active Lebanese electorate were found to receive 6% of the
government’s total financial allocations for public services. Shia, 27% of the voting population,
were a beneficiary of 27% of expenditures (Salti., Chaaban, 2010). These figures display the
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disbursement of state capital as based on sectarian divisions rather than the educational needs of
the citizenry.
Iraq’s watershed opportunity arose with the drafting and ratification of the new
constitution in 2005. Significant measurements were taken to mandate a nondiscriminatory
provision of education services. Article 34 stipulated, “education is a right to all people and is
necessary for the progress of society.” Article number four established Iraq’s two primary
languages as Arabic and Kurdish while upholding the right of every citizen to use their mother
tongue, i.e. Turkomen, Armenian etc (UNESCO, 2011). While the constitution attempted to
promote equality the new government also systemized division along sectarian lines through the
de facto sectarian distribution of government posts, thus reinforcing the effect it was meant to
curb. Like the Ta’if Accord, the IGC’s ethno-religious quota system struggled to fight fire with
fire. A version of this quota system eventually materialized in de-jure form with the 2008
elections law (Hazran, 2011).

Reform Initiatives
Following these transformations, reform initiatives developed in a remarkably analogous
manner.
Lebanon’s 1993 Educational Development Plan had three primary ambitions, inspired in
part by the guidelines of the Ta’if Accord. First, the plan would have worked to cultivate
Lebanese national sentiments as a means to unify the 18 competing sects. Second, it would
encourage tolerance and coexistence among youth in the school setting. Third, development was
meant to include the promotion of democratic principles (Shuyab, 2007).
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The 1993 plan was rejected by the ministers of the time, who criticized the specifics of
the project as being modeled on the Jordanian system that could not have been introduced due to
budgetary restrictions. Two years later committee personnel returned from the drawing board
with the New Framework for Education in Lebanon. The “new” strategy carried over the goals of
the Education Development Plan, which centered on the abolition of sectarianism through
national upbringing and the creation of standard textbooks (Shuyab, 2007).
Iraq also proposed educational refinements three years after its major structural
alterations. In 2008, the New Education Philosophy was finalized. Some of its most salient
objectives included the promotion of democratic principles, stressing tolerance and coexistence,
and teaching creative problem solving and critical thinking skills. However, the new blueprint
also called for an integration of faith into the national curriculum (UNESCO, 2011). This
ordinance could risk reinforcing primordial sectarian identities at the expense of state
sovereignty.
In 2010 came the Education Development Plan. Like the New Framework for Education
in Lebanon it adopted the doctrine of its forerunner. The Education Development Plan has a
lifespan of four years and will be implemented until the 2014 year (UNESCO, 2011).

Contemporary Challenges
The core of these reform initiatives targets school curriculums, infrastructure deficiencies
and learning environments at the grassroots level. In Lebanon these factors are further
complicated by the autonomous nature of private schools set up by the constitution. This, in
combination with a $40 billion dollar national debt, has in effect evoked self-imposed
sanctioning that severely restricts the resources available to public education facilities. Between
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2004 and 2007, spending on education hovered at 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a rate
well below the average for the Middle East. As a result it is estimated that 90% of government
education spending goes directly to salaries and compensation. Consequent inadequacies in state
schooling have driven citizens to widely prefer the sectarian-segregated religious alternatives.
According to a study that surveyed students in public and private, secular and non-secular
establishments, religious schools were reported to garner a strikingly higher level of satisfaction
(Shuyab, 2007). Affording these private institutions often requires the support of a whole family
and forces spending cuts in other matters of daily life. Private funding for education frequently
exceeds 10% of total household expenditure (Abouchedid, K., Nasser, R., & Jeremy, V. B.,
2002).
The overreliance on costly nonpublic schooling has resulted in an inverted enrollment
pyramid where the proportion of students attending private schools is smallest at the lowest
levels of education and highest at the university level (Nahas, 2011). It is estimated that only
nine in 1000 children who enter the first year of primary school will eventually receive a
baccalaureate (Abouchedid, K., Nasser, R., & Jeremy, V. B., 2002).
Not only are the costs of private schooling prohibitive, students enrolled in these nonstate institutions are almost always highly segregated from compatriots of other religions.
Socially isolated, children are then subject to the opposing narratives interpreted by the religious
hierarchies that control them. Further, Lebanon’s civil war forced the emigration of whole
populations. Many in mixed areas relocated to the relative comfort of their religiously
homogenous enclaves in an attempt to escape sectarian violence. By the end of the war much of
Lebanon had partitioned itself into uniform localities. This effect of de-facto gerrymandering
vertically dissociated government officials from their sectarian rivals by consolidating their
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consociational constituents while expelling potential dissidents. Policy makers then had little
incentive to compromise on public education reform, instead content to uphold the religious
structures that helped maintain their power. Polarization deepened throughout levels of
government and society at large. In the absence of Lebanese nationalism people turned to
embrace foreign states that supported their sect against others as part of a larger, regional
religious/ideological conflict.
Lebanon’s attempts at improving the school system post Ta’if have been invested chiefly
in resolving the divisive textbook issue. As mandated by the New Education Framework a
revised standard set of textbooks were in fact produced by 1998. Arts and sciences related
publications were widely implemented in both public and private schools. New editions of civic
course materials were released again in 2002. However, the Minister of Education suspended the
use of the revised history text in 2001 (Kriener, 2012). The setback meant that Lebanese
curriculums would once again suffer the lack of a shared national experience.
Today there are two main curricula used for the teaching of history in Lebanon. One tract
is from 1971 while the latest was approved by a presidential decree in 2000. Serving each
program are over 40 series of history books that are used within the educational system, although
three are used more prominently than others. Of these only one is authored by the CERD. The
text, aptly named History, was published in the 1980’s and includes almost no legitimate
sources. Although severely outdated the books are circulated annually among some 34,000
students of primarily Sunni and Shia constituencies. The 4,500 students of the Druze community
use another book entitled Scientific History. Whereas History lacks credibility, Scientific History
lacks actual Lebanese events and reports mostly on past political decisions. Both of these series
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purport that the Jews fought Jesus Christ while disregarding the fact that Jesus and his followers
would have been Jews themselves (Kriener, 2012).
Lastly, approximately 25,000 students enrolled in the Shia south use History and Us,
which was published in the early 1990’s (Kriener, 2012). Schools of the region are administered
by the Hezbollah ministate that has developed since the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) withdrawal
in 2000. However, with Syria and Israel having long given up on Golan negotiations, IDF
evacuation also meant that Hezbollah would have to seek new credibility as the defenders of
Lebanon’s border. The scramble for legitimacy ushered in the era at present in which the Party of
God competes politically with the central government for control of service provision. Following
the Hezbollah/Isreali war in 2006, Hezbi guerillas could be seen passing out hundreds in cash to
those whose homes were destroyed (Fischer, 2006). The movement emerged from the conflict
with minor setbacks in fighting capacities but with broad support from the Lebanese population.
With help from Iranian funding the organization has come to fills gaps in the substandard
education system. Hezbollah’s Education Unit operates schools from the elementary to college
levels at low rates in comparison with other private sector alternatives (Flanigan & Samad,
2009). Religious Madrassas, vocational schools for girls, and health and fitness programs are
also made available at the hand of the Education Unit (Sorenson, 2010).
Extra curricular life does not go unaddressed either. Hezbollah’s Boy Scout troop, the
Mahdi Scouts, is comprised of 60,000 children who can be seen wearing Hezbi uniforms,
marching in the Hezbollah hosted Ashoura parades. Those who graduate from the troop go on to
become militant fighters. Lebanese and tourists alike also enjoy Hezbollah sponsored public
parks, skate parks, and theme parks (Sorenson, 2010). Within the last decade, a multi million-
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dollar museum for resistance was constructed to showcase the destruction of Israel. Inside,
patrons can gaze on dismembered Israeli tanks and other propaganda (Batty & Toolis, 2006).
The Education Unit operates two primary affiliates, the Mahdi and Mustafa Associations,
which between them administer 19 schools. The students of low-income households are awarded
scholarships and additional financial assistance. Prior to the start of each academic year
Hezbollah purchases bulk orders of textbooks and resells them on street corners at more
discounted prices (Harik, 2004). Their standard, History and Us, appears to be the most biased of
the three leading texts. The series presents Judaism as having deviated from the original message
of God’s prophets. Further it states that the Jews attempt to “justify their self perception as the
chosen people who others should serve as slaves. Christianity was a movement that tried to
correct the Jews wrongs but fragmented into different sects that quarreled over the nature of
Christ” (Keriner, 2012).
Another threat to the national identity is the use of language in Lebanese schools.
Although the national language is Arabic, schools and students differ along sectarian lines when
it comes to which languages are preferred. Divisions began in the late 19th century when France
began to establish religious schools that taught French language to the Maronites and other
Catholics. The British also opened up schools among the Druze areas that encouraged the spread
of English (Ghaith, 2003).
In modern times the popularity of English has risen acutely (Shaaban & Ghaith, 2003).
This is partly due to the perception that the language is more pragmatically useful in the realms
of business whereas French is viewed as the language of Lebanese cultural and artistic activities
and Arabic that of Lebanese heritage (Haraty, & Oueini, 2000). Despite its role as the national
language students often favor foreign languages over Arabic due to the difficulty of Standard
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Arabic, which is taught in private and public classrooms. Sentiments however may differ among
Muslim educators, whose schools generally use Arabic more in instruction, as it is the language
of the Quran (Bahous, Bacha & Nabhani, 2011).
Finally the results of the 2010 Salti/Chaaban study on the role of sectarianism in the
allocation of public expenditures show that Lebanese education also suffers from a
misappropriation of government funding based of sectarian considerations as opposed to level of
poverty, agency or other measures of need. This misallocation of capital is a testament to the
perverse incentive that results from the sect-oriented structure of the Confessional model, which
rewards sect-based decision-making.
In 1996 the effects of consociational corruption shut down the Lebanese University, the
only state university in the county, for a period of months when government officials couldn’t
come to consensus regarding the sectarian distribution of deans. Ethno-religious infighting
extends accordingly into grade school institutions as well. In a 2007 survey five principals’
political ties were investigated of which four had direct ties to party leaders (Shuyab, 2007).

~~
In contrast, Iraq’s immediate educational challenges suffer immensely from the
consequences of war, economic collapse, and blundering restructuring policies as well as
sectarian corruption. At the time of invasion, thirteen years of choking sanctions had bled the
education system tremendously. Embargo had also set in among the research community, which
was cut off from the outside world (Lamani, M., & Momani, B., 2010). Hyperinflation
depreciated Iraqi currency and Saddam brazenly cut import tariffs to encourage investment. The
surge of foreign goods outcompeted many local businesses but prices for basic commodities
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climbed. Washington’s sparse Oil for Food Program did help to assuage the effects of the
sanctions it had imposed, however service shortages continued to multiply (Issa, J., & Jamil, H.,
2010). This climate encouraged systemic corruption that proliferated into many aspects everyday
life.
The disintegration of Iraqi society was thereafter compounded by the invasion of
coalition forces under the pretext that Saddam was producing WMDs that posed an existential
threat. In the initial weeks following the fall of the Baath regime, theft, compelled by the poverty
induced through the era of sanctions, ran rampant. 17 of 23 ministry buildings were destroyed,
including the Ministry of Higher Learning and Scientific Research, which was looted repeatedly.
84% of tertiary establishments were gutted leaving Iraq’s former trophy school system in
shambles. Within the first month an estimated $12 billion worth of equipment and supplies had
been stolen across the country (Lamani, M., & Momani, B., 2010). In 2010 Iraq was short 12,522
schools required to accommodate the student population. Children were packed into classes at a
ratio of 44:1 (Geopolicity, 2009).
Those schools and agencies left standing were in poor condition and fell victim to
national infrastructure deficiencies. As late as 2007 the Brookings Institute estimated that
Baghdad received only about six hours of electricity per day, down from 16-24 hours prior to the
war. Blackouts severely handicapped learning environments, disenfranchised students, and drove
down enrollment rates (Ismael, 2008).
Initially the United States’ singular educational goal was to restore the school system to
its pre-war capacities. However, this goal was juxtaposed with the contradicting policy of
DeBaathification, which terminated some 28,000 teachers. Replacements were haphazardly
recruited and were chronically unqualified. The CPA further decided to dismiss the entire Iraqi
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Army and rebuild from scratch. The decision to disassemble one of the country’s largest
workforces instantly added between eight and ten percent to the soaring unemployment rate
(Lamani., Momani, 2010).
In an effort to spur development and kick-start economic recovery Paul Bremmer
advocated large-scale privatization and diversification. His attempt to rapidly overturn 50 years
of socialism was predisposed to the vexations of corruption and conflict. Business opportunities
were granted to a myriad of American contractors who were enlisted in mass. Bechtel, a “Buddy
Corporation,” was awarded a $2.2 billion dollar cost-plus contract to rebuild schools and restore
other infrastructure. Despite its massive revenues Bechtel left without having completed a single
project (Ismael, 2008).
Nepotism became increasingly institutionalized into Iraqi society. Ghassan Dibeh,
professor of economics at the Lebanese American University, commented that, “the creation of a
consociational democracy in Iraq in the post-invasion period has increased rent-seeking amongst
the various ethnic and confessional groups.” Even Nouri al-Malaki, two-time prime minister of
Iraq, has been documented systematically discharging offices responsible for investigating and
preventing corruption cases (Ismael, 2008). In 2007, 100 doctors petitioned Britain for $33
billion in aid for development. Nearly $14 billion of that figure was skimmed off through
corruption, theft and mercenary salaries (Lamani, M., & Momani, B., 2010).
The threat of violent injury came to weaken many aspects of Iraqi society and pervaded
all aforementioned development initiatives. War, waged primarily between coalition forces, alQaeda, and a Sunni insurgency, intensified following the bombing of a sacred Shia shrine at
Samarra in 2006. Soon after, Iraqi Shia militarized and civil war ensued. Kurdish Peshmerga
forces also waged pitched territorial battles, however most of the fighting progressed as Sunni
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VS. Shia. Heightened levels of insecurity resulted in the exaggeration of sectarian religious faith
and adherence to their independent doctrines. In Basra, Shia militants even forced the
segregation of classrooms between male and female genders (Lamani, M., & Momani, B.,
(2010).
The hazards of the civil war years often prevented Iraqis from venturing from their
homes. Unrestricted by law enforcement, gangsterism proliferated and militia death squads
sometimes terroized the streets (Lamani, M., & Momani, B., 2010). By 2006, there were an
average of 30 kidnappings per day in Baghdad alone. That year, attendance rates plummeted to
just 30%, which fell from 75% in 2005. The MEHL reported that only 40% of children passed
their primary examinations, this percentile also down from 60% in 2005. One 2006 survey found
that 92% of children suffered from learning impairments brought about by the stress of living in
a war zone. Half of the respondents were determined to be on the verge of mental retardation due
to “paralyzing fear.” Approximately 900,000 children were developmentally handicapped and
required psychological treatment. At the same time, drug use among Iraqi youth increased by
20% (Ismael, 2008).
The American occupying force responded with a “Surge” that largely subdued the civil
conflict. This however did not resolve the pedagogic plight of Iraqi children or address the
destruction of Iraqi state education services. In 2008, Iraq hosted three million orphans, scores of
whom wound up begging in the streets. A study that sampled from the population of beggar
children reported that 43% of girls and 16% of boys were literate (lsmael, 2008).
In addition to repairing its education infrastructure and training a new generation of
teachers, the new government must also find common ground in redesigning the state
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curriculum. As was the case in Lebanon, Iraq’s education system was deficient in fostering a
sense of national unity during its period of civil war. Sectarian hierarchies were therefore
unchecked in reinforcing primordial loyalties, which furthered factionalization.
This was compounded by the intensity of Iraq’s ethnic conflict, especially following the
2006 bombing of the Al-Askariya Shrine in Samarra that held the bodies of highly honored Shia
Imam’s. The tomb’s destruction galvanized Shia resentment and many organized into mobs that
prowled the cities, retaliating against Arab-Sunnis and destroying mosques. Others were driven
into the ranks of Shia militias such as the Badr Corps that was responsible for the deaths of
hundreds of Iraqis. According to government sources assassinations were conducted every hour
for the entirety of the month of April (Bouillon, Malone, & Rowswell, 2007).
The alarming level of violence impelled Iraqi residents to flee from ethnically mixed
areas and seek protection among their sectarian neighborhoods. As civil warfare continued Iraq
became increasingly self-segregated into consociationally homogenous communities (Kaufmann,
2007). This de facto partition may result in ethnically uniform schools where the lack of diversity
could facilitate the emergence of differing historical narratives, each favoring the various sects.
Threats to a common national upbringing must be addressed to ensure a cohesive Iraqi
nationalism.
In 2003 CPA authorities eliminated the previous national curriculum and appointed a
committee to draft an entirely new, intermediate syllabus. Schools became broadcast towers for
American proselytism. Bill Evers, an U.S. advisor to the Ministry of Education said, “entire
swaths of 20th century history have been removed.” The new learning strategy omitted the eightyear Iran/Iraq war, the 1991 Gulf War, and content that could promote Arab nationalism. “The
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children are not learning about Iraq, they are learning about U.S. self-congratulatory
propaganda,” said Evers (Lamani, M., & Momani, B., 2010).

Toward The Future
Lebanon took on a series of reform initiatives buoyed by optimism and ambition
following the end of the civil war. However, their goal to abolish sectarianism from the school
setting became mired within the sectarian political system. In 2010 new Quality Teaching for
Development legislation was passed. The plan aims to improve the teaching abilities of educators
over the next five years (Mattar, 2011). But no matter how qualified the teacher the lack of
shared historical perspective will continue to impede Lebanese nationalism and contribute to
ethno-religious segregation. Unfortunately, the prospects for reform remain bleak as the
communal religious leaders with the most power to reform education also have the incentive to
perpetuate the current system, which fortifies their leadership.
Iraq in contrast has intriguingly shown more promise in recent years. The 2010
parliamentary elections could signal a shift away from sectarian politics as the majority of
successful candidates ran on highly secular platforms. However, a closer inspection of vote
casting exposes that votes tended to be cast along sectarian lines. For example, although the two
most victorious Shia parties campaigned on secular and national messages the majority of their
constituent votes were also Shia (Hazran, 2010).
Education in Iraq could further suffer as sectarianism becomes complicated with
geopolitical issues. At the end of 2012 tensions between the Kurdish regional government and
Baghdad came to a head when Turkey forged a unilateral deal with the Kurds to build an
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exclusive oil pipeline from northern Iraq to Turkey. Much of Iraq’s oil, the country’s primary
source of revenue, is located in the Kurdish area of Kirkuk, which has made it the epicenter of
political contention. In December, when Iraqi Federal agents went to arrest a Kurdish man in the
northern autonomous region, a firefight broke out that spurred the deployment of Iraqi military
forces to the area. In response the President of the Kurdish region, Masoud Barzani, deployed his
Peshmerga forces (Arango & Adnan, 2012). The standoff drastically escalated Kurdish tensions
with the Shia dominated government of Baghdad.
Unrest has also intensified between Iraq’s Shia and Sunnis. In February of 2013 hundreds
of thousands of Sunnia protesters took to the streets in an effort to pressure and even end the rule
of Shia prime minister Nouri al-Malaki (Arraf, 2013). Sunni and Shia animosity then transitioned
from largely peaceful demonstrations to violence as Iraq suffered a dramatic spike in public
violence and terrorism into the month of May. According to the UN over 700 people were killed
in April alone, which is the highest monthly toll since the years of civil war (Iraq violence,
2013). Some Shia have called for the declaration of their own Federal Region Status that would
likely carve them an enclave with control of the southern ports. With Iraq’s two most lucrative
resources, Oil in the North and the ports in the South, under the control of the Kurds and the Shia
federalism runs the risk of further alienating the Sunnis of the central west. Recently however,
both Shia and Kurds are tilting toward pursuing their own regions (Wilgenburg, 2012). Sunni
protesters have even warned of open war if their demands for a federal region aren’t met (Saleh,
2013).
If sectarian violence or civil war results in the fragmentation of Iraq into 3 separate
regions each ethno-religious group would be bolstered by a higher degree of autonomy
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associated with the federal status. This would interfere with the implementation of a national
educational curriculum.
Lebanon also faces the threatening effects of renewed sectarian fervor in 2013. The civil
war in Syria has drawn in the involvement of Hezbollah that supports the Syrian Alawite regime
against a mostly Sunni insurgency. The increasingly sectarian nature of the civil war has stirred
tensions throughout Lebanon, but especially in northern cities with Alawite populations and in
Hezbollah controlled areas (Illmer, 2013).
Secondly, the 2011-year brought the New Iraqi Curriculum Framework. The
development of this framework aims to produce a standard competency-based learning plan to be
implemented in schools in both Baghdad as well as the more autonomous Kurdistan federal
region. Perhaps most importantly, standard textbooks are to be published and implemented
throughout Iraq (Mattar, 2011).
Both Iraq and Lebanon currently face enormous challenges in creating a cohesive
citizenry for a sustainable future. Although reform initiatives have tried to steer education
development in constructive directions sectarian politics and foreign influences have reduced
them to little more than rhetoric. It remains to be seen whether or not either state can move
beyond their current challenges. Iraq however, shows more potential in moving toward a future
of coexistence. As evinced by Lebanon’s resume of reform mistakes, educational success will
hinge on rehabilitating school infrastructure, checking the power of religious institutions and
encouraging a shared sense of nationalism through common history texts.

The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics

40

Bibliography
Abouchedid, K., Nasser, R., & Jeremy, V. B. (2002). The limitations of inter-group learning in
confessional school systems: The case of lebanon. Arab Studies Quarterly, 24(4), 61-61.
Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/220607844?accountid=15099;
http://sfxhosted.exlibrisgroup.com/wmichsfx?url_ver=Z39.882004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&genre=unknown&sid=ProQ:ProQ%3A
ethnicnewswatch&atitle=The+limitations+of+intergroup+learning+in+confessional+school+systems%3A+The+case+of+Lebanon&title=Ar
ab+Studies+Quarterly&issn=02713519&date=2002-1001&volume=24&issue=4&spage=61&au=Abouchedid%2C+Kamal%3BNasser%2C+Ra
mzi%3BJeremy+Van+Blommestein&isbn=&jtitle=Arab+Studies+Quarterly&btitle=;
http://partneraccess.oclc.org/wcpa/servlet/Search?wcapi=1&wcpartner=proquesta&wcaut
ho=100141360&wcissn=02713519&wcdoctype=ser
Arango, T., & Adnan, D. (2012, 12 3). For Iraq, the year ends they way it begun, with guns
drawn. New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/middleeast/iraqs-latest-crisis-is-a-standoffwith-northern-kurds.html?_r=1&
Arraf, J. (2013, 2 1). Protests surge in Iraq’s Sunni regions, testing Malaki. Christian Science
Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/World/MiddleEast/2013/0201/Protests-surge-in-Iraq-s-Sunni-regions-testing-Maliki
Avard, C. (2006). Ambassador claims shortly before invasion, Bush didn’t know there were two
sects of Islam. The Raw Story. Retrieved From
http://www.rawstory.com/news/2006/Ambassador_claims_shortly_before_invasion_Bus
h_0804.html
Baer, R. (2002). See no evil: the true story of a ground soldier in the cia’s war on terrorism.
New York, New York: Three Rivers Press
Bahous, R., Bacha, N. N., & Nabhani, M. (2011). Multilingual educational trends and practices
in lebanon: A case study.International Review of Education, 57(5-6), 737-749.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11159-011-9250-8
Batty, D., & Director, Toolis, K. (2006). The cult of the suicide bomber.
Bengio, O. (2012). The Kurds of Iraq: Building a state within a state. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
Blanford, N. (2011). Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s thirty-year struggle against Israel.
Random House Publishing Group. New York, NY.
Bouillon, M., Malone, D., & Rowswell, B. (2007). Iraq: Preventing a new generation of conflict.
Lynne Rienner Publishers

The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics

41

Chandrasekaran, R. (2006). Imperial Life in the Emerald City. Knpof Publishing. New York,
NY.
Dixion, P. (2011). Is consociation theory the answer to global conflict? From the Netherlands to
Northern Ireland and Iraq. Political Studies Review.309-322(9) Retrieved from
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.library.wmich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.14789302.2011.00235.x/abstract
Frayha, N. (2003). Education and social cohesion in Lebanon. Prospects, 33(1), 77-88. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1022664415479
Friedman, T. L. (1989). From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York, New York: Anchor Books
Fischer, M. (2006). Hezbollah funds rebuild Beirut: truce still holds as UN struggles to hold its
promised peacekeeping force. The Vancouver Sun, p, 1. Retrieved from
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?csi=8370&shr=t&sr=BYLINE(Fish
er+w%2F3+Matthew)+AND+HLEAD(Hezbollah+funds+rebuild+Beirut)+AND+DA
TE+IS+2006
Gause, F. (2010). The International Relations of The Persian Gulf. Cambridge University Press.
NY.
Geopolicity. (2009). Iraq education sector scooping study. geopolicity. Retrieved from
http://www.geopolicity.com/upload/content/pub_1288013876_regular.pdf
Haraty, N., & Oueini, A. (2000). Current research in multilingualism and education in Lebanon:
A report. Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies, 6(1), 81-90. https://wmichilliad-oclcorg.libproxy.library.wmich.edu/illiad/illiad.dll?Action=10&Form=75&Value=633680
Harb, I. (2006). Lebanon’s confessionalism: problems and prospects. Retrieved from
http://www.usip.org/publications/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and-prospects
Harik, J. P. (2004). Hezbollah: the changing face of terrorism. New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillian
Hazran, Y. (2010). The rise of politicized Shi’ite religiosity and the territorial state of Iraq and
Lebanon. The Middle East Journal. Retrieved from
http://go.galegroup.com.libproxy.library.wmich.edu/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALE
%7CA242453087&v=2.1&u=lom_wmichu&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w&authCount=1
Iraq violence: Baghdad car bombs kill at least 66. (2013, 5 27). BBC. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22682400

The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics

42

Ismael, S. (2008). The lost generation of Iraq: children caught in the crossfire. International
Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. 151-163.
Issa, J., & Jamil, H. (2010). Overview of education systems in contemporary Iraq. European
Journal of Social Sciences. 14(3) Retrieved from
http://www.eurojournals.com/ejss_14_3_02.pdf
Katzman, Kenneth. (2013). Iraq: politics, governance and human rights. Retrieved from
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf
Kaufmann, Chaim. (2007). Why Iraq partitioned itself. Columbia International Affairs Online.
Retrieved from
https://wwwapp.cc.columbia.edu/shibds/ciaods/DS?entityID=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ci
aonet.org%2Fshibboleth&return=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ciaonet.org%2FShibboleth.ss
o%2FDS%3FSAMLDS%3D1%26target%3Dcookie%253A8a8fe09c
Kheir, Mahmoud. (2011, November 01). Supporters of Hariri, Berri fight at Beirut university.
The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Nov01/152795-student-supporters-of-hariri-berri-fight-at-beirutuniversity.ashx#ixzz2Tkv8nPiM
Kriener, J. (2012). The politics of education reform in the Middle East. Retrieved from
http://site.ebrary.com.libproxy.library.wmich.edu/lib/wmichlib/docDetail.action?docID=
10578600
Lamani, M., & Momani, B. (2010). From desolation to reconstruction: Iraq’s troubled journey.
Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Ontario, CA
Mattar, D. (2011). Factors affecting the performance of public schools in Lebanon. International
Journal of Education Development. 32(2) Retrieved from
http://www.sciencedirect.com.libproxy.library.wmich.edu/science/article/pii/S073805931
1000514
Meijer, Roel (2009). Islam’s New Religious Movement. New York: Columbia University Press,
eBook.
<http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=b4y02X0YcGsC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq
=salafism&ots=KBPw_fPTBo&sig=e3csv-yKGbWu4aQV8lu3KA5VGyE
Nahas, C. (2011). Financing and political economy of higher education: The case of
lebanon. Prospects, 41(1), 69-95. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11125-011-9183-9
Nasr, S. V. R. (2006). The Shia revival: How conflicts within Islam will shape the future. New
York: Norton.
Power, P. (2002). A Problem from Hell. Harper Collins Publishers. New York, NY

The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics

43

Saleh, O. (Producer). (2013, May 24). Iraqi Sunnis protest for sovereign region. Al-Jazeera.
Podcast retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2013/05/201352417949332274.html
Salibi, K. S. 1. (1988). A house of many mansions: The history of Lebanon reconsidered.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Salti, N., & Chaaban, J. (2010). The role of sectarianism in the allocation of public expenditure
in postwar lebanon. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 42(4), 637-655. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743810000851
http://partneraccess.oclc.org/wcpa/servlet/Search?wcapi=1&wcpartner=proquesta&wcaut
ho=100141360&wcissn=00331538&wcdoctype=ser
Saltman, K. J. (2007). Schooling in disaster capitalism: How the political right is using disaster
to privatize public schooling.Teacher Education Quarterly, 34(2), 131-156. Retrieved
from http://search.proquest.com/docview/61933636?accountid=15099
Sorenson, D. S. (2010). Global security watch: Lebanon a reference handbook. Santa Barbara,
California: ABC-CLIO, LLC
Shaaban, Kassim., & Ghaith, Ghazi. (2003). Effect of religion, first foreign language, and gender
on the perception of the utility of language. Journal of Language Identity and
Education, 2(1), 53-77.
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.library.wmich.edu/ehost/detail?sid=e97fc25e053d-487c-856a5d7503f73b94%40sessionmgr113&vid=1&hid=112&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3Qtb
Gl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=ufh&AN=9731820
Shuyab, M. (2007). Education, a means for social cohesion of the Lebanese confessional society.
Breaking the cycle. 167-196. Retrieved From
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.library.wmich.edu/docview/195588169/fulltextPDF?
accountid=15099
Illmer, A. (2013, May 29). Syria’s shadow of war reaches Lebanon. DW. Retrieved from
http://www.dw.de/syrias-shadow-of-war-reaches-lebanon/a-16844126
Tikriti, Nabil. (2007). Ottoman Iraq. Journal of the Historical Society, 7(2), 201-211.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.library.wmich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.15405923.2007.00214.x/citedby?globalMessage=0
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2011). World data on
education. United Nations. 7. Retrieved from
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002114/211439e.pdf
Wilgenburg, W. (2012). Breaking from Baghdad. World Affairs Journal. 175(4), 47-53.

The Confessional Model and Sectarian Politics
Yildiz, K. (2012). The future of Kurdistan: The Iraqi dilemma. London: Pluto Press.
Young, M. (2010). The ghosts of Martyrs Square: An eyewitness account of Lebenon's life
struggle (1st Simon & Schuster hardcover ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster.

44

